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Russia to build up-to-date base for nuclear submarines equipped with superpowerful Bulava missiles

Pravda (Russia), July 10, 2007

Russia will build a new base of nuclear submarines in the Kamchatka region (Russia’s Far East), Interfax reports quoting Admiral Vladimir Masorin, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy. It will be the most modern naval base in Russia, the agency quotes the official as saying.

The base, where latest models of nuclear-powered submarines (Borei class) will be stationed, will be built in the town of Vilyuchinsky, in Kamchatka.

“There will be a complex life support system created for them, as well as the necessary infrastructure, which particularly includes a special energy supply system when water and steam will be delivered to the submarines from the coast. Over nine billion rubles have been allocated from the state budget for the purposes,” Vladimir Masorin said.

A new hospital for submariners will also be opened in Vilyuchinsk in October-November of the current year. The hospital, Masorin said, will be equipped with up-to-date medical technologies.

Russia launched the first nuclear submarine (Yuri Dolgoruky) of Borei class in April of the current year. Two other similar subs – Alexander Nevsky and Vladimir Monomakh – are said to be complete in 2010.

The three nuclear cruisers will be used in the Pacific Ocean. According to the project, each of the subs will be outfitted with 12 Bulava ballistic missiles. The missiles are capable of delivering ten nuclear warheads at a distance of up to 8,000 kilometers. The previous base of the Soviet and Russian fleet of nuclear submarines was located in the town of Severomorsk, in the Kola Peninsula.

Admiral Vladimir Masorin arrived in Kamchatka from Murmansk, where he made several other important statements. The official said that only contracted military men would serve on Russia’s naval vessels after 2009. In addition, he said, Russia was going to start the construction of its first-ever aircraft carrier after 2015 that would carry up to 30 planes and helicopters. There are 19 Russian submarines and surface vessels patrolling the World Ocean at the moment.

China’s Current Military Capabilities

By Raul Colon, globalresearch.ca, July 9, 2007

In the past few years, The People’s Republic of China’s growing military capability has attracted a great deal of interest, but major details regarding China’s near-future military strength have been hard to combine. At this very moment, China is spending massive amounts of financial resources in order to improve extend its overall military capability.

This spike of budgetary expenses by China is setup in the background of the country’s need to upgrade its low-tech armed forces. At this time, reports have placed the number of deployable nuclear weapons China possesses at four hundred. Of these, around twenty are deployed in the Intercontinental ballistic missile configuration. Nearly two hundred and twenty are reported to be deployed in various delivery platforms such as aircrafts, submarines and short-to-medium range missile systems.

All of these weapons are of tactical capability. The remaining weapons are held in tactical reserves for short range missiles, low yield attacks and demolition purposes. The Central Military Commission, headed by the Chinese President, is the sole administrator of the country’s nuclear arsenal.

China’s current Intercontinental ballistic missile force of twenty units is mainly used as a deterrence force. The main component of the system is the Dong-Feng 5 liquid-fueled missile, with an estimated range of 13,000 km and can carry a single use, multi-megaton warhead.

The Dong-Feng 5 was first deployed in the summer of 1981 and has remained the backbone of China’s ICBM force for the past two decades. Twenty frontline Feng 5’s are believed to be stationed in full alert somewhere in Central China. The Feng 5 was a drastic change from the early versions of China’s ballistic missiles.

Those early missiles were mainly stored in caves and were rolled-out for launch. The Feng 5 can be launched from vertical silos after just a few hours of the order being received by their launch crews.

The Feng 5 operational range gave China the ability to launch a small nuclear attack against most of Europe, Asia and some parts of the United States, mainly the southeast part of the country. Today, two additional missile platforms are deployed or being tested for possible deployment by China. They are the medium range DF 31’s, which entered first-line operation in 2005, and its long range variant, the DF 41, which is expected to be fielded by late 2010. Both missiles are going to be propelled by solid fuel cells and based on mobile launchers. China is expected to attempt producing a multiple re-entry vehicle (MVRs) for their new missile systems. An attempt to produce the more technical challenge multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) is underway.

China also deploys intermediate range ballistic missiles and medium range ballistic missile systems. These weapon platforms are capable of threatening the security of many countries in Asia, including India, but its effects on the overall strategic security of Russia are minimal.

China’s intermediate missile systems are also capable of hitting targets on Japan’s coastal cities and United States base stations in South Korea and Japan. The oldest missile platform deployed by China is the near stationary DF 3A missile system. This missile platform is being phased-out in favor of the more modern DF 4 and DF 21 systems. The DF 4, with a maximum operating range of 4,750 km, is still the backbone of China’s regional deterrence force. The DF 4 is a liquid fueled system that operates out of fixed launch sites. With the deployment of the DF 21 in 1986 , China’s regional ballistic missile capabilities increased twofold.

The operational DF 21 has a range of 1,800km and is carried in mobile launchers for security reasons. The DF 21 is also the base of China’s sea-launch ballistic missile systems. The older, liquid fueled missiles can carry a single nuclear warhead of an estimate 3.3mt yield. The newest missiles also carry a single warhead with maximum yields in the hundreds kilotons range. China also possesses a limited number of short-range ballistic missile batteries. The DF 11/M 11, with an operational range of 300km, and the DF 15/M 9, with a range of 600km, are the backbone of China’s tactical force. Is believed that most of this missile platforms are configured to carry only a small nuclear or conventional warhead.

China’s bomber force is based on the local production of Russian made aircrafts first deployed in the 1950s. With the overdue retirement of the Ilyushin IL-28 bomber from front-line, nuclear delivery role, the Tu-16 Badger assumes the role of a medium range, nuclear strike bomber. Being a product of the 1950s technology, the Tu-16 could only carry two or three nuclear bombs over a range of 1,5,00 to 3,100km. China is believed to have over 130 of these vintage planes in operational conditions.

The Chinese Navy also operated the Tu-16 in a reserve role primarily. Although the Chinese Air Force possesses a great number of other possible nuclear carrying aircrafts, such as the venerable Mig-21, the Russian supplied Su-27, and the newly designed JH-7s; they are not believed to be used for such a role. The Chinese Air Force also has a large inventory of strike and fighter aircrafts at their disposal. It is estimated that by 2004 China has a total aircraft inventory of around 4,200 operational aircrafts of many types. This inventory includes all the variants of the J-6 or Mig-19 fighter, J-7 or Mig-21, Su-27, IL 28 and Tu 16 bombers. Of these aircrafts, the vast majority entered service with the Chinese air force before 1970. The tactical airlift aspect of the air force is at a diminishing capability.

Over the last two decades, Chinese leaders have stressed the development of a localized aerospace industry sector capable of designing and developing advanced avionics needed for military aircrafts. Despite the investment of large amounts of budgetary and human resources, the Chinese had not shown the ability to promptly design, develop and mass produce an indigenous combat aircraft. The recently revealed J-7, and the J-8, both of which took so long in their developmental stages that by the time they were ready to enter front-line services they were already obsolete by Western standards, showed China the need for more investment in financial and human resources as well as the training of experienced technicians to work in all aspects of the technical design of a combat aircraft.

The same holds true of the most vaunted of China’s aircraft developments, the J-10. China is not alone in this area, other countries had tried in the past to design and mass- produce indigenous aircraft systems, most notable Israel, South Africa, India, Taiwan and south Korea; all abandoned their programs in favor of purchasing existing and proved aircraft types from the five largest weapons producers: the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and Germany. The main reason is the fact that the economic resources needed, not only to design a generation-leaping aircraft, but to be mass produced for local consume, are so massive that developing countries with a small industrial base simply can not afford to spend the necessary resources for a long period of time. This also holds true of large economies with a small gross national product output such as Russia, which is lagging far behind the Western countries in military technology designs. As a direct result of their failure to establish a permanent industrial base capable of producing front-line aircrafts, China has renewed its imports of combat airplanes from Russia.

China also has the distinction of having one of the largest conventional military force in the world. The shear mass of numbers is enough to make a potential enemy think twice about provoking China. The truth is that, although the number of weapons is impressive, most of China’s military hardware is obsolete, both physically and technologically. Most of the weapon platforms utilized by China today, entered service in the 1950s, 60s and 70s and still serve the country in front-line units. Although the systems varied in age of development and deployment, the technologies used to create them are sorely based on Soviet blueprints of the 1950s. As a result, while older systems are being phased-out, the overall size of China’s conventional weapon force would be reducing. As of late 2001, estimates reported the size of China’s military force as 2.5 men under arms, of which, roughly 1.8 serve the People’s Liberation Army (China’s ground forces). They are divided into 27 military districts through the country. Within these districts lie 20 army groups, each containing around 60,000 men. They are subdivided into 44 infantry, 5 artillery, and 10 armored divisions. There are also brigade-sized groups in these army units. There are also three airborne divisions under the direct command of the Chinese Air Force. The reserve units are mostly compromised of infantry, artillery and anti-aircrafts divisions. These forces are estimated to be composed of 1.1 million personnel. There’s also the People of China Para-military units. The Armed Police, Border Defense Force and the Forces of the Ministry of Defense compromise a large sector in China’s strategic reserves. They counted a total of forty four divisions.

These reserve formations are expected to increase in size as China moves forward with its major modernization and re-organization plans that emphasizes the movement of active troop formations to the strategic reserve roles. The Army’s equipment is also being phased-out as new models were introduced to the force.

China’s main battle tank platform, the Soviet designed T-54/55, also a product of the 1950s technologies, is no longer the main tank platform. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, China designed, with Soviet cooperation, and produced various tanks systems, but although their designs were more recently than that of the T-54, its overall capabilities are about the same. All of this changed in the summer of 1988, when China unveiled its newest battle tank, the Type 80. The 80 represents China’s first attempt at breaking with Soviet design concepts for a battle tank. The 80 had a formidable set of systems, some of them are: fire and control computerized? system, a laser range finder, a gun control system and night fighting capability. This tank breakthrough was followed by the Type 85, introduced in the mid 1990s as follow-up development of the 80. China’s latest main battle tank system, the massive T-90II, first revealed in 1991, is still not completely operational with the PLA. This new tank resembles in more than one way, the mainstay of Russian tank formations, and the T-72 heavy tank.

China also possesses a force of around 2,100 light tanks, which as it is with much of their weapon systems, are based on Soviets designs from the 1950s. It is estimated that China’s tank strength is between 9,000 to 11,000 units. This number is deceiving; the majority of tanks in China’s front-line services are systems with over forty years of service life. Most of them could not function properly and a great number of them could not function at all. The most interesting part of the situation is that China, which like the former Soviet Union, tends to value numbers more than any other matters, thus service maintenance of existing systems is poor. The same maintenance problem applies to the new weapons platform entering service today. Thus a major gap exists today in main battle tank design between China and the Western countries, the Chinese are in the processes of designing a new tank system that could compare with that of the Europeans; also they would like to emphasize quality over quantity. With these developments and the expected reduction in its tank force, China expects to be able to support its main battle tank systems with more efficiency in the future.

For most of its history, the People’s Liberation Army Navy submarine fleet has consisted of a small number of coastal vessels. The mainstay of their coastal fleet was the domestic produced version of Russia’s Romeo class submarine. It’s estimated that between 20 to 30 Romeos are still operational with the PALN. In the early 1970s, China decided to start a submarine development and production program aimed to build a local submarine in five years. It succeeded; the first indigenous submarine developed by China is the Ming Class. Although they are not better than the Romeos, they do represent China’s first attempt at self-sufficiency in designing weapon platforms.

The next Chinese submarine class, the Song, entered service with the PALN in late 1999. In addition to these subs, China has purchased or is in the process of acquiring, more samples of the Russian-made Kilo Class submarines. In the nuclear-powered submarine field, China’s first attempt to produce a local system produced disappointing results for the PALN. The Han Class first entered service in 1974. Major power plant problems plagued the lead ship of this class. So much so, that the next commissioning of a Han Class sub was not made until mid 1980. China is also believed to be developing, with considerable assistance from Russia, a follow-on nuclear attack submarine, very similar to the Russian’s Victor III Class. China’s SSBN force consists of the Xia Class submarine, which is fitted to launch twelve Ju Lang-1 missiles with a single warhead of 200-300kt and an operational range of 1,700km. In part to its technical difficulties, the Xia Class is never deployed beyond regional waters. The newer submarine class, codename Type 094, would have better reactors and a quieter signature than its predecessors.

This new class would be able to deploy 16 JL-2 missile, each capable of carrying up to six nuclear warheads. China’s surface fleet has been growing in size since the 1970s. The Chinese posses a number of Soviet-build Sovremenny destroyers as its main surface fleet weapon platform. They are equipped to carry the advanced SS-N-22 Sunburn supersonic, anti-shipping missile system. The Chinese are also building its own class of destroyers, the Luhai Class which displaces 6,000 tons. The lead ship of this class entered service in late 1999. The largest class of destroyers China operates is the Luda Class. China operates about sixteen of these ships. The remaining force is compromised of 37 frigates. As in the case of destroyers, China’s frigate force is mostly used as an air-defense force.

China’s amphibious assault fleet is the Achilles heels of the PALN. China possessed around 49 amphibious assault vessels with full displacement of 1,000 tons. Many of these vessels are vintage WW II systems. Most of them, being United States Navy’s LST used in assaults around the South Pacific. China is planning to deploy an aircraft carrier. They are looking at buying a platform, most likely from Russia. The carrier probably needs to be conventional on take-off and landing aircrafts since China does not posses vertical, short take-off and landing aircraft capability. Since China would probably would like to supply the air wings of the carrier with its Ju-10 fighters and Su-27 fighter-bombers, they would probably would need a carrier platform that could displace around 50,000 tons, which would put China in the need to acquire a carrier like the Russian Kuznetsov or the French Charles de Gaulle. China’s need to acquire a carrier capability is probably more for internal promotion that to actually being a first attempt by them to deploy a Blue Water navy.

The small size of China’s amphibious fleet would exclude the Chinese from taking control of Taiwan by means of an amphibious assault. In the past, Chinese leaders had threatened to take action against Taiwan if the island, which China considered a renegade province, if Taiwan decided to declare its independence. The reality is that even if China decided to use force, it lacked the necessary military resources needed to complete the operation. An amphibious assault, which is the only mean a China could take control of Taiwan’s territories, is out of the equation. First, China can only transport one armored division across the Straits, and even this would be hard to accomplish. Second, any amphibious landing would need complete control over the skies in the Strait, which the Chinese air force probably could not accomplish. Finally, both Taiwan and the United States could see the signs of pending military offensive months before the actual event. What China could do is to attack Taiwan with a barrage of missiles, the DF 15 and the DF 11. These missile systems are not accurate enough to destroy strategic targets such as airfields, radar stations and transport facilities; their only use would be as terror weapons, such as the V-2 or the Scud. If they are not fitted with nuclear warheads, the damage they could cause would be similar to a natural disaster. China also possesses a limited number of these missiles and any missile siege would be limited in duration. A naval blockade of the island is possible, but due to the strong U.S. statement regarding any attack on Taiwan and the notion of a powerful U.S. fleet coming to relive the besieged island, China would be hard pressed to perform any naval operation in the area.

The reality is that China is investing massive amounts of money to modernize its armed forces, but the current force structure is so old, that the rate of retirement will surpass the rate of acquisition in all major weapon platform systems. This fact means that China overall military force would decrease in size. Aircraft, missile systems and ground combat systems would decrease in numbers, the only possible exception could be China’s surface ship fleet. Also, the modernization process is slow due to the massive investment needed to accomplish it. China is also adding a small number of new technology weapon systems to its overall arsenal. New weapon platforms are purchased in small quantities, which can not dramatically alter the balance of power. China current acquisitions of Russian systems are not as impressive as they might look. Those systems are not comparable to the ones fielded by the United States or Japan.

The main problem of China’s militarization might be their inability to develop a continuous indigenous weapons industry, which produces next-generation military technology. Which could be used on their existing or newest systems? The recent reversal of policy by the Chinese government, from developing its own weapon systems to purchasing systems, mainly from Russia and Israel; has left the government in Peking without control over the military they so desperately desire. For the foreseeable future, China’s potential military action, mainly against Taiwan, is limited, let alone branching out of the regional setting they are now. Overall, the balance of power in East Asia would remain the same for the next decade.

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For the first time ever the total collection of WWII Submarine War Patrol Reports will soon be available by on-line and CD purchase.  This is the culmination of a massive effort to have the microfilm records of some 256 boats and 1,547 patrols brought up to current technoloogy. 

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The Cold War is back

By Fraser Nelson, The Spectator (U.K.), July 14, 2007

A little over a week ago, Vladimir Putin tested a weapon deadlier than anything developed by the Soviet Union. A missile launched from a submarine in the White Sea entered the stratosphere and returned precisely on target 3,800 miles away in the Russian Far East — the other side of the world. Such tests are meant to send messages. The target could just have easily been Tehran, Los Angeles or London. It signaled that Russia means business. After a hiatus of two decades, the arms race is back.

While Britain has been fixated with the Middle East and Iraq, it has paid insufficient attention to the increasingly aggressive noises emanating from the Kremlin. Mr Putin was never very enthusiastic about Russia becoming a part of the West — but now, flush with gas and oil revenues, he has left its orbit altogether. The Russian military is once again treating Nato as the glavny protivnik, the primary enemy, and drawing up plans for a nuclear war. And Putin’s explicit aim is to challenge, and then counter, America’s world dominance.

As recently as six years ago, such an ambition would have been laughable. Then, Russia was an economic basket-case which had been admitted into the G7 group of industrialised nations only as an act of charity. The main security issue in Russia was how to stop its nuclear fuel being sold for scrap to rogue states. But, in those days, oil was $17 a barrel. Now it is $75 and rising. For a country which pumps out more oil than any on earth, save for Saudi Arabia, the consequences could scarcely have been more dramatic. Russia now has a huge surplus, has banked £25 billion in a ‘stabilisation fund’ and has the third-largest currency reserves in the world.

Rather than invest this bounty in Russia’s crumbling infrastructure or its imploding health service, Mr Putin has gone on an arms spending spree. In 2001, the defence budget was 140 billion roubles; today it stands at 870 billion (£16.7 billion) — a sixfold increase, and the fastest in Russia’s peacetime history. Last year, he added six new intercontinental missiles to his arsenal, 12 launch vehicles, 31 battle tanks and seven Mi-28N night attack helicopters. And this is but a small taste of what is to come.

The missile tested last week takes off so fast that no missile defence system could detect it in time. The new variant of the Topol-M missile will have multiple warheads, which splinter so they cannot be shot out of the sky. America’s floundering missile defence system cannot hope to offer protection. Washington struggles to keep up: two months ago, another interceptor missile fired off Alaska fell into the Pacific having failed to recognise, far less hit, its target. America is losing the ballistic missile game.

Meanwhile, Mr Putin has learnt to use energy as a weapon. Russia is sitting on the largest stretch of gas reserves in the world and Europe already depends on Russia for a quarter of its gas. The Kremlin knows that energy security is intimately intertwined with national security, and tested its strength the winter before last when it temporarily suspended gas supply to Ukraine in an argument about prices. Germany is expected to rely on Russia for 80 per cent of its gas within a decade.

Precisely what Mr Putin intends to do with this muscle was made astonishingly clear in February when he delivered a speech at the Munich security conference. It was a ‘J’accuse’ to America, serving notice that Russia had moved from ally to adversary. ‘The United States has overstepped its borders in all spheres — economic, political and humanitarian, and has imposed itself on other states,’ he declared. ‘This is the world of one master, one sovereign.’ And his objective is to challenge such hegemony.

To Britain, all this sounds almost quaintly absurd. The recent debate about renewing Trident reckoned without a nuclear confrontation with Russia. Yet this is precisely what Mr Putin’s troops are being trained to expect. The view in London is fundamentally different from the view in Warsaw, which is watching the Kremlin’s assertiveness with alarm. In Moscow much of the Cold War mindset is returning (minus the communist ideology) — whereby Nato is the enemy, and perceived as a growing threat.

The irony, of course, is that by many of its own members, Nato is seen increasingly as an anachronism. It played no role after the attacks of 11 and itsSeptember 2001 — other than a routine invocation of Article 5 — peacekeeping efforts in Afghanistan have been a testimony only to the reluctance of its members to share an even burden or agree a clear set of priorities. The phrase ‘coalition of the willing’ became popular in Washington partly because expectations of Nato solidarity are so low.

In this context of slow decline the admission of former Warsaw Pact countries into the club is seen simply as an act of friendship. Yet within the paranoid confines of the Kremlin such gestures are seen as new and sinister manifestations of Western imperialism. When Mr Putin is called upon to explain his extraordinary arms build-up, he points to the expansion of Nato.

The architect of the new Russian military is Sergei Ivanov, for six years defence secretary, now promoted to Deputy Prime Minister and favourite to succeed Mr Putin next March. ‘In the mid-1990s, we counted on the fact that the collapse of the Soviet Union would lead to the end of the Cold War — that Nato would not move to the east,’ he said in a recent interview. ‘But now we see everyone deceived us.’

Washington now hopes to position missile defence interceptors in eastern Europe. Congressional funding for the scheme is far from secure, and, seven years ago, Mr Putin said quite explicitly he was happy for a shared anti-missile system to proceed. Yet his response last month was incendiary. If the interceptors were mobilised, the Russian President declared, ‘then we disclaim responsibility for our retaliatory steps, because it is not we who are the initiators of the new arms race which is undoubtedly brewing in Europe’.

Connecticut's Namesake Sub Leaving Groton For New Home

By Jennifer Grogan, New London Day, July 16, 2007

Groton — The USS San Francisco is in Bremerton, Wash., while the USS Bremerton is in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The USS Hawaii is temporarily in Groton, and soon the USS Connecticut will be permanently in Bremerton.

Just because you put your name on it, it does not mean you get to keep it.

“It's just a very sad time,” said Dolores “Dee” Hauber, vice chairwoman of the original commissioning committee for the Connecticut (SSN 22). “It shouldn't be happening. She should still be here.”

The Connecticut, a Seawolf-class submarine commissioned in 1998, has always called the Naval Submarine Base in Groton its home. But it will soon join the other two ships of the class at Naval Base Kitsap — USS Jimmy Carter, which is already at the Washington base, and USS Seawolf, which is on its way there.

“The Navy needs us in the Pacific because that is where the threats are,” said Cmdr. Daniel G. Christofferson, commanding officer of the Connecticut. “We will be closer to the fight when our country needs us, and we can bring our capabilities to bear.”

The move will also make it easier for the Seawolf-class submarines to share parts and technical expertise, Christofferson said.

After a regularly scheduled six-month deployment, the Connecticut will go to Bremerton.

Connecticut crew members were in the final stages of preparing for the deployment last week. Several sailors stood on top of the submarine and guided the torpedoes down into the torpedo room.

A crane lifted each torpedo off Pier 17 and lowered it onto a deck skid, which acts as a conveyor, on top of the sub- marine. The torpedo was tilted at a 45-degree angle and lowered through the hatch into the torpedo room for testing and storage.

Seven torpedoes were already on board by mid-afternoon Thursday and Christofferson wanted a dozen in the torpedo room by the end of the day. Loading all the weapons, about 42 torpedoes and missiles, is a four-day project.

“It's a little bittersweet,” Christofferson said. “Groton is a great place to be. It will be sad to see the bridge close the last time we head out.”

Some of the crew said they were excited for a change of scenery.

“I didn't sign up for submarines to be tied next to the pier the whole time,” said Electrician's Mate 3rd Class Karl Lokken.

The Connecticut has been in port for about four years for maintenance. It will join Submarine Development Squadron Five at Naval Base Kitsap. Capt. Butch Howard, development squadron commodore, is a former commanding officer of the Seawolf.

“I took her on her first deployment so it's somewhat ironic that in my new position, I'm getting ready to receive the Seawolf and Connecticut into the squadron,” Howard said. “It's a little bit of a homecoming.”

The squadron is prepared for the submarines' arrival, Howard said.

“We formed a team across the organizations here to run through a lot of the 'what if' scenarios, and we've identified all the hiccups to date and taken action,” he said. “We have a real solid plan, and the ships have played a large part in making that transition as smooth as possible.”

U.S. Rep. Joe Courtney, D-2nd District, said he hopes the Connecticut will be an “ambassador” for the state.

“If anyone sees it in Washington State and asks why Connecticut was picked for the name, I think there is a great answer for that,” Courtney said. “I don't think there is a state in the country that has a deeper identification with the submarine fleet than ours.”

The departure of the Connecticut leaves 16 fast-attack nuclear submarines and NR-1, the Navy's only nuclear-powered, deep-diving ocean engineering and research submarine, in Groton.

Another Groton-based submarine, the USS Albuquerque, is headed to San Diego in 2008. The relocations are part of the Navy's realignment process, where 60 percent of the submarine force will be stationed in the Pacific. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the latest Pentagon reassessment of the military, recommended the shift to the West Coast.

“I am deeply disappointed with the Navy's decision to transfer the USS Connecticut to Washington State,” Gov. M. Jodi Rell said in a statement.

While the move is a disappointment to some, it is not a surprise.

The Navy's realignment plan was taken into account during the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment process, or BRAC, when the Naval Submarine Base was slated for closure. The base escaped that fate when the independent Base Closure and Realignment Commission overruled the Pentagon's proposal.

“This action should not affect future decisions regarding base closings,” Rell said.

Others involved in the fight to save the base were more concerned with the moves.

If there are fewer submarines in the Atlantic, fewer piers and support facilities will be needed, said John C. Markowicz, chairman of the Subase Realignment Coalition, which fought the Pentagon's proposal.

“If the trend continues, the base will be extremely vulnerable,” he said.

The Connecticut, built by Electric Boat, is the fifth Navy ship to bear the state name. The submarine has won several awards, including the Battle Efficiency “E” for Submarine Squadron 4.

Having the namesake ship of the state in Groton was “a feather in the cap of southeastern Connecticut,” said John Stratton, a member of the commissioning committee.

“It's a little piece of Connecticut that will be on the West Coast,” he said. “We hope they don't forget us, because we won't forget them.”